Delegate and Secretary of the Rhode Island Constitutional Convention James Langevin, foreground right, takes the microphone to address the convention during a session on June 11, 1986. The last time Rhode Island had a Constitutional Convention was in 1986 . (Still from the Rhode Island Archives)
Who are the main funders of referendums on constitutional conventions? Rhode Island coalition leaders oppose a convention. RI Citizens for a responsible governmentreport that “wealthy special interests,” including “out-of-state” and “dark money” interests, are supporting congressional referendums. However, the evidence shows the opposite.
Rhode Island’s “No” coalition makes some valid general points about financing ballot measures:
1) The rich can spend unlimited money on referendums (but that has been allowed since 1978, and not since 2010, as the ‘no’ coalition claims.)
2) Large amounts of money have been spent trying to influence referendums.
3) Money can influence the outcome of a referendum.
But when the coalition compares ‘no’ and ‘yes’ campaigns, it is getting the facts backwards.
‘No’ campaigns spend much more money than ‘yes’ campaigns. In fact, “no” campaigns are backed by the most powerful special interest groups in every state. And “no” campaigns are also supported by out-of-state interests – usually national organizations that support their state affiliates.
To consider Alaska in 2022the last election cycle with a congressional referendum.
The “no” side raised $4.8 million, the “yes” side raised $61,600, giving the “yes” side a 78:1 advantage. Because political science shows that a ballot dollar spent defending the status quo is far more effective than one spent proposing change, the nominal benefit of 78:1 vastly underestimates the effective benefit.
Per capita, the “no” campaign was the most expensive “no” campaign of all 140 ballot measures in the US. There was also the largest amount of foreign and dark money per capita.
The combined out-of-state money and dark money represented 67.4% of the total “none” spending and all came from DC-based countries. Sixteen Thirty Fundthat is run by a former political operative for the National Education Association. The state’s money came mainly from local unions, especially unions representing government employees. For the ‘yes’ campaign, the money came mainly from individuals, with the largest ‘yes’ contribution ($10,000) being only 0.002 times as large as the largest ‘no’ contribution ($3.2 million).
In Rhode Island in 2014, the last time the congressional referendum was voted on, the “no” side contributed $151,800 and the “yes” side contributed $41,500, a 3.7 advantage. As in Alaska, the predominant “no” funders and organizers were unions and the predominant “yes” funders were individuals. Rhode Island hasn’t had an Alaska-style dark money problem; there was mainly a problem with enforcement of disclosure – a campaign finance system that favors the rich and powerful over everyone else who, for example, cannot afford the high legal fees required to enforce the law.
As of October 16, 2024, the ‘No’ coalition had raised $119,700 for campaign advertising, including $15,000 of the out-of-state National Education Association, according to campaign finance reports filed with the Rhode Island Board of Elections. There is currently no “yes” campaign.
A major difference between the ‘no’ and ‘yes’ sides concerns the run-up to a referendum, when polls indicate that the ‘yes’ side could win. Here the ‘no’ side seems to be able to spend whatever it takes to secure a victory, while the ‘yes’ side cannot. This may be because unions, such as the National Education Association, maintain a large fund to support their local branches in such a situation.
‘No’ campaigns spend much more money than ‘yes’ campaigns. In fact, “no” campaigns are backed by the most powerful special interest groups in every state.
What explains the campaign finance imbalance between the “Yes” and “No” campaigns? One explanation relates to the democratic function of the congressional process, which, like the ballot initiative (which Rhode Island lacks), is to circumvent the monopoly gatekeeping power of the legislature. This makes not only the legislature, but also the special interest groups that excel at influencing the legislature, the natural enemies of the convention process. A second explanation is that improving government infrastructure—the core function of the congressional process—is an essential public good and thus faces serious collective action problems. An analogy is the different collective action problems faced by producers (e.g., airlines) versus consumers (e.g., passengers); the former are well organized and financed, the latter are not. Likewise, ‘no’ parties are better financed and organized than ‘yes’ parties.
From the end of 19e until early 20se For centuries, large companies mainly organized ‘no’ campaigns. Starts in late 20se century it became great work. Big business still plays a major role in fighting conventions in Republican states; much less in Democratic states such as Rhode Island.
To truly understand who would benefit from a convention, look no further than who funds and orchestrates “no” campaigns. Claims inconsistent with this funding data are Machiavellian politics. After the 2004 referendum, Edward Achorn, the editorial page editor of the Providence Journal, was persuasive argued the ‘no’ campaign not only successfully hid its funding, but did so because revealing it in a timely manner could have resulted in it becoming the clthis election. His insights are as relevant today as they were then.
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