WASHINGTON — The House task force investigating the assassination attempts on Donald Trump released its final report Tuesday, which made dozens of recommendations, including that the Secret Service record all radio broadcasts and scale back protection of foreign leaders to focus on protecting the president and others. Top American officials.
The 180-page report includes 25 recommendations specifically related to the July 13 assassination attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania, where a gunman’s bullet grazed Trump’s ear during a campaign rally. It also contains eleven general recommendations for the Secret Service.
“The Task Force concluded that the tragic and shocking events in Butler, Pennsylvania were preventable and should not have happened. However, there was no single moment or decision that allowed Thomas Matthew Crooks to come close to killing the former president,” the 13-member commission wrote in the report. “The various failures in planning, implementation and leadership on and before July 13, 2024, and the pre-existing conditions that undermined the effectiveness of the human and material resources deployed that day, coalesced to create an environment in which the former president – and everyone at the campaign event – were exposed to grave danger.”
The task force, led by Chairman Mike Kelly, R-Pa., and Rep. Jason Crow, D-Colo., praised how the Secret Service prevented a second attack on Trump later in the year in Florida: “Conversely, the events that occurred on September 15, 2024 in West Palm Beach, Florida, has shown how well-executed protective measures can thwart an attempted murder.”
Donald Trump on July 13, 2024 in Butler, Pennsylvania.
Among its recommendations, the bipartisan panel said the Secret Service should record all radio broadcasts, which did not happen in Butler on July 13. “The absence of radio logs or recordings significantly limits the ability to reconstruct events for research or evaluation purposes,” the report said.
And the panel recommended that Congress, the Homeland Security Department and the U.S. Secret Service should “consider the protective role the USSS plays for foreign leaders and consider whether such duties could be transferred or abolished in order to focus on its primary mission of the USSS: Protecting the President and Other Critical American Leaders.”
The Assassination Task Force also said the Secret Service should consider additional staffing or flexible postings “for moments of high pressure” to allow the agency to adapt to changing situations; provide more “robust” training for non-Secret Service personnel on-site assisting the USSS; and develop and formalize a process to handle USSS conflicts with protected persons personnel.
“During the course of our investigation, several Secret Service members expressed frustrations during negotiations with staff, regardless of political party or protected person,” the report said.
The task force said it had accessed 18,000 documents and interviewed dozens of witnesses, but added that the FBI only gave the group access to 81 of more than 1,000 witness interview summaries.
The task force said it identified multiple “decision points” that, if handled differently, could have stopped gunman Thomas Crooks from firing eight shots at the Butler gathering.
Failure to secure a high-risk area adjacent to the Butler rally site — the American Glass Research (AGR) grounds and building complex — allowed Crooks to evade law enforcement, climb onto the complex’s roof and open fire, the task force said.
The Secret Service also did not provide clear guidance to state and local partners about which entity was responsible for securing the area, the task force said. Concerns about a lack of manpower were raised but not properly addressed, the group said, and local sniper teams stationed at the AGR site believed they were responsible for monitoring the rally venue and the public and not the area outside the secure perimeter.
“The failures that led to the tragic events of July 13 were not entirely unrelated to the campaign event itself, or to the days leading up to it. Pre-existing leadership and training issues created an environment in which the specific failures identified above could occur,” the task force wrote.
“Secret Service personnel with little to no experience in pre-planning tasks were given significant responsibility, despite the July 13 event being held at a higher risk outdoor location with many visibility issues, in addition to specific information about a long-term threat distance. ,” the task force said.
“Additionally, some Secret Service agents in key pre-planning roles did not clearly understand the boundaries of their responsibilities.”
This article was originally published on NBCNews.com
