Deciphering the murky machinations of elite politics is an activity that Western China watchers are all too familiar with. But as the US election approaches, analysts in China are struggling to unpack what separates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump when it comes to their stance on the US’s biggest geopolitical rival.
Commentators are calling it the vibes election. For Beijing, despite the cheers and booing from Harris’ campaign, her feelings are largely similar to Trump’s.
“Harris will continue Biden’s policies toward China,” said Wang Yiwei, professor of international studies at Renmin University in Beijing. What are Biden’s policies? He is a “Trumpist without Trump,” says Wang.
Harris has done little to dispel the belief that her position on China will be largely the same as Biden’s should she win the November election. In her keynote address at the Democratic National Convention on August 22, China was mentioned only once: she pledged to ensure that “America, not China, wins the battle for the 21st century.”
Harris has little foreign policy record on which to judge him. But in an economic policy speech on August 16, she emphasized her goal of “building our middle class,” a view Biden has used to justify imposing high tariffs on Chinese imports, extending Donald Trump’s trade war .
Beijing fundamentally does not see that there is much difference between a Democratic or Republican controlled White House. The aggressive stance toward China has become one of the few bipartisan issues in American politics.
In a recent piece for Foreign Affairs, leading foreign policy commentators Wang Jisi, Hu Ran and Zhao Jianwei wrote that “Chinese strategists harbor few illusions that US policy toward China could change course over the next decade… they assume that whoever is elected in November 2024 will continue to prioritize strategic competition and even containment in Washington’s approach to Beijing.” The authors predicted that while Harris’ policymaking would likely be “more organized and predictable” than Trump’s, both would be “strategically consistent.”
Jude Blanchette, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, also said US-China relations would remain tense regardless of who was in the White House. “The US-China relationship is trending negatively regardless of who comes to power next January, but a Trump 2.0 would likely bring significantly more economic friction due to an almost certain trade war,” Blanchette said.
Even in areas where US-China cooperation used to be more fruitful, such as climate policy, there are concerns that such exchanges are on thin ice. In a recent briefing, Kate Logan, deputy climate director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, noted that China appears to be placing “a greater emphasis on subnational cooperation”: dialogues at the provincial or state level rather than negotiations between Washington and Beijing. This is partly driven by concerns that if Trump is re-elected, climate diplomacy at the national level could be jeopardized.
Related: ‘Always Remember’: How Tim Walz’s Time in China Shaped Him
Harris’ appointment of Minnestoa Governor Tim Walz also came as a shock to Chinese America watchers. Having taught in China in 1989 and 1990 and traveled extensively there in the years since, Walz has more China experience than anyone on a presidential ticket since George HW Bush. But beyond Walz’s continued support for human rights in China, it is unclear how he could or would shape the White House’s China policy if Harris were to win in November.
More impactful would be the national security team that Harris is putting together. Her current national security adviser, Philip Gordon, is a likely choice. In 2019, Gordon signed an open letter warning against treating China as “an enemy” of the US. Some analysts have speculated that his more recent experiences in the White House may have pushed him in an aggressive direction. But in a recent conversation with the Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank in New York, Gordon refrained from describing China as an enemy or a threat. Instead, he repeatedly referred to the “challenge” from China – a challenge that the US should be concerned about, but which could be contained.
In a sign that Beijing and Washington still intend to stabilize ties, Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, arrived in Beijing on Tuesday to meet with Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister. High on the Chinese agenda will be Taiwan, which in January elected Lai Ching-te, who is detested by Beijing, as president. Lai is a member of the pro-sovereignty Democratic Progressive party. For Beijing, a red line in US-China relations is US support for “separatist forces”, of which the country sees Lai as an agent.
Beijing is making adherence to its version of the “one China” principle – the idea that Taiwan is part of the rightful territory of the People’s Republic of China – central to its international diplomacy. China’s official reading of President Xi Jinping’s meeting with Biden in November described the Taiwan issue as “the most important and sensitive issue in Sino-US relations.”
Certain members of China’s foreign policy establishment welcome the idea of a second Trump term, seeing Trump as a business-minded player who would be reluctant to lend American resources or moral support to the Taiwanese cause sovereignty. Wang, a professor at Renmin University, said Trump has less respect for the international alliance system than Biden, which works to China’s advantage. “His allies don’t trust him very much… Taiwan is more concerned about Trump,” Wang said.
But Trump is also unpredictable. In the event of a Trump presidency, Blanchette notes, “he will be surrounded by advisors who are hawkish on China and very likely pro-Taiwan. That will not determine his decisions, but it will shape them.”
Early in his presidential term, Trump was actually quite popular in Taiwan due to his tough stance on China. But views have cooled, especially after his recent comments suggesting Taiwan should pay the US to defend the country. Local headlines compared him to a gangster running a protection racket.
The same media have aligned themselves with Walz, highlighting his time spent in both China and Taiwan, and his support of Tibet and Hong Kong. Some describe him as the friendly ‘neighborhood uncle’.
According to a recent poll from the Brookings Institution, 55% of people in Taiwan think the US will help Taiwan’s defense regardless of who is in the White House.
There is tentative agreement among analysts and diplomats, with some saying that while the rhetoric would be very different under Trump, actual policy would not change that much.
“Obviously the personalities are dramatically different, but the US national interests are not,” said Drew Thompson, a senior fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.
“Both governments will step in and recognize Taiwan’s innate value to the U.S. as a democratic partner in a difficult neighborhood, as a key security partner, a key trading partner, and a critical ICT provider. [information and communication technology] goods.”
Contingencies are being prepared in Taipei, but in reality US support for Taiwan is firmly entrenched in laws like the Taiwan Relations Act, and – by design – quite difficult for a single government to change on a whim.
But improving relations between the two countries is unlikely to be high on Trump’s agenda, and he is unlikely to expend political capital on Taiwan.
“I think the greater American interest, if Trump were to expend political capital to engage Xi Jinping, would be the American economy, not brokering cross-strait peace,” Thompson said.
Experts believe a similar, America-first case could be made to Trump regarding tensions in the South China Sea: the US and the Philippines have a mutual defense treaty and the US formally recognizes the Philippines’ claims to waters and islets that are disputed with China. just like an international tribunal in 2016). But while there are fears about Trump’s volatile attitude toward international alliances, the previous Trump administration’s position on the dispute largely mirrored that of the Biden administration, and the fact that about 60% of global maritime trade passing through the disputed waterway ensures stability there. important to the American economy.
For normal people in Taiwan, the election feels like an event that could shape their future, despite the fact that they have no say in it. Zhang Zhi-yu, a 71-year-old shopkeeper in Hualien, a city on Taiwan’s east coast, says Trump is “crazy and irresponsible.”
But she concludes: “There is no point in worrying about war… we are just ordinary people. If a foreign country wants to save Taiwan, people like us will not be saved first.”
