In late July 2024, the Israeli military sent the first 1,000 conscription notices to ultra-Orthodox Jewish men, after the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the government no longer had to exempt them.
But will these Haredim, as the ultra-Orthodox in Israel are called, actually join the Israel Defense Forces and be followed by thousands of others in the near future? It depends on whom they obey: the state authorities or their religious authorities.
Yitzhak Yosef, whose term as one of the government’s two chief rabbis recently ended, told religious students that “anyone who receives a call-up letter should tear it up and not go,” Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper reported. “He is a soldier in God’s army.”
Yosef is not the only Haredi rabbi opposed to military service. Since the Supreme Court ruling, which followed years of political wrangling over the issue, many Haredi men have taken to the streets to protest.
Since the founding of the state of Israel in 1948, ultra-Orthodox Jews—those who take the strictest approach to following Jewish law and now make up about 14 percent of the population—have been exempt from military service. Of all other Jewish citizens, from secular to modern Orthodox, men must serve 32 months and women 24, plus reserve duty. Amid the war in the Gaza Strip, resentment among other Israelis over the ultra-Orthodox exemption is strong.
As a historian, I see the debate over conscription as more than a political crisis for the Israeli government. The question is so sensitive because it raises fundamental questions about the cohesion of Israeli society in general and the attitude of the Haredi population toward the Jewish state in particular.
It also illustrates the complexity of a country, which is not as easy to explain as many supporters and opponents think.
Initial compromise
Historically, Orthodox Jews struggled to justify the idea of a Jewish state. They prayed for centuries to return to Jerusalem and rebuild the Temple, but they had a specific return in mind: a Jewish state established by the Messiah. Any other form of Jewish sovereignty, they believed, would be blasphemy.
Theodor Herzl, who founded modern political Zionism in the late 1800s, had a long beard like a biblical prophet. Yet he was thoroughly secular and assimilated—he even lit a Christmas tree with his family. Herzl’s movement to encourage more European Jews to migrate to the Holy Land had little appeal to the Orthodox.
There was always a minority among the Orthodox who identified with Zionism, the belief that the Jewish people should have a sovereign political state in the Land of Israel. According to the Talmud, the central source of Jewish law, saving lives is more important than other commandments—and Zionism saved Jews from pogroms and other anti-Jewish violence in Europe.
During the Holocaust, the vast majority of practicing Jews in Eastern Europe were murdered. Afterward, many survivors who had previously opposed Zionism sought refuge in the new state of Israel.
On the eve of Israel’s independence, David Ben-Gurion, the prime minister of the future state, concluded an agreement with the leaders of the two camps of Orthodox Jews.
The Haredim, or ultra-Orthodox, still refused to recognize the legitimacy of a secular Jewish state. The so-called national religious camp, on the other hand, embraced it.
Among other concessions, the new state granted exemptions to young Haredi Jews who wished to study religious texts full-time rather than join the army. This seemed of little consequence, since the young men in question numbered only a few hundred men.
Changing visions
During the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel captured the Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem, as well as the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. Since then, the national religious camp, once a moderate force, has emerged as the spearhead of the right-wing settler movement.
Unlike the first generations of Orthodox Zionists, national-religious Israelis today are Zionists not in spite of messianism, but because of it. Israel, they believe, will help bring about the messianic era. That is why right-wing religious Zionists—such as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich—are enthusiastic advocates of military service.
This does not apply to the Haredim, the ultra-Orthodox.
To be clear, Haredi Jews are extremely diverse. This demographic includes families with roots everywhere from Poland and Romania to Morocco and Iraq. It includes people who support Israel’s existence and those who oppose it and burn the flag on the country’s Independence Day. It includes men who join the workforce and men who devote their lives to religious study.
The majority of Haredim living in Israel are not Zionists, but live there because it is the Holy Land and the state subsidizes their studies. Everything else – secular education, military service, and often paid work – is seen as a distraction.
A minority of Haredi Jews serve voluntarily in the armed forces, and more have enlisted since the start of the last war between Israel and Hamas. But they are not legally required to do so; nor are Arab citizens of Israel.
Growing Haredi Sector
Israeli governments continue to tolerate this situation, as ultra-Orthodox political parties have become much-needed partners.
However, legal and social opposition has increased.
In 1998, the Supreme Court ruled that the defense minister has no right to exempt Haredi Jews from military service and asked the government to find ways to use them. In 2014, a center-right government under Netanyahu passed a law aimed at requiring 60 percent of Haredi men to serve within three years. But the 2015 elections brought Haredi parties back to power and the implementation was effectively halted.
Since then, Haredi parties have become more powerful as their populations grow. Yet the Supreme Court has made it clear that the government must either draft Haredim or the legislature must come up with a new law to excuse them.
Seven in 10 Israeli Jews oppose the blanket exemption, meaning a new exemption could jeopardize Netanyahu’s government. Frustration is also growing over plans to extend men’s military service to three years and double reservists’ service to 42 days a year during emergencies.
None of this would matter if the Haredim were the same small part of society they were in 1948. Today, however, ultra-Orthodox women have an average of 6.5 children, compared to 2.5 for other Jewish Israeli women. Furthermore, about 1.3 million of the country’s 9.5 million residents are Haredim.
The resulting transformation of Israeli society is easy to see. If the trend continues, Israel will become a very different, very religious society – one that can barely survive economically.
On average, a non-Haredi household pays nine times more income tax than a Haredi, while the latter receive more than 50 percent more state aid. Even if they were willing to work, most Haredim would struggle to find well-paying jobs, as their state-subsidized private schools rarely teach secular subjects.
For Israeli society, this spells further fragmentation and a weakening of the economy—not to mention the military. In the eyes of Haredim, however, Israel is successful because of the study and prayer of religious Jews.
In total, the state plans to issue draft orders to 3,000 Haredi men in the coming weeks, and they are not being chosen at random. Most work or study in institutions of higher learning, rather than traditional religious schools. This small group could indeed be following the secular state authorities, rather than the calls of their rabbis.
Without even a minimal secular education, however, the majority of Haredi youth would not be able to easily integrate into the army. Therefore, the conscription of this segment of the Israeli population may remain more symbolic – telling them that they too must share more than the spiritual burden of a war-torn society.
This is an updated version of an article originally published on March 15, 2024.
This article is republished from The Conversation, an independent nonprofit organization that brings you facts and analysis to help you understand our complex world.
It is written by: Michael Brenner, American University.
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Michael Brenner is not an employee of, an advisor to, an owner of stock in, or a recipient of funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond his academic appointment.
