Russia could lose key military bases in post-Assad Syria. Here are 3 possible scenarios for his presence.

• Russia faces the prospect of losing key bases in Syria, but still has steps to go.

• Keeping its bases could amount to lucrative deals with the now victorious groups it had attacked.

• These bases are critical to Russian influence in the Middle East and would not be easily replaced.

Syria has played a central role in Russia’s plans to spread power across the Middle East – as evidenced by the recent signing of a 49-year lease on Syrian bases.

But after the ouster of the ally it supported, Syrian President Bashar Assad, Russian officials are faced with the likelihood that their days in Syria are numbered.

“Russia is certainly doing everything in its power to maintain its presence in Syria while preparing for the possibility that this is the end,” said Ben Dubow, a non-resident senior fellow at the Democratic Resilience Program Center for European Policy Analysis, told Business Insider.

Moscow does this by “not only leaving their ships at sea, but also by… [Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s] official Telegram channel, which distributes weapons to local Alawite groups,” Dubow said. “Reaching out to the new leadership is both an act of desperation and an acceptance of the new reality.”

This is a look at the dimming options Russia now faces.

Reduced footprint

Shortly after Assad fled to Russia, an agreement was reportedly reached with the interim authorities, led by the victorious Islamist movement Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, guaranteeing the security of these bases, and the armed opposition currently has no plans to to attack them. Yet it is far from clear that the future leadership in Damascus is willing to tolerate a prolonged Russian military presence.

For now, some Russian warships are anchored outside the Tartus base as a precaution, and there are other Russian military movements in Syria.

“There is quite a bit of military equipment that has been hastily withdrawn to the coastal region or is currently being withdrawn from various remote areas,” Anton Mardasov, a non-resident scientist at the Middle East Institute’s Syria program, told BI. “So the ships going to Syria from the Baltic Fleet and the military transport planes coming to Hmeimim can take out this excess equipment.”

In addition to its Tartus naval base, Russia also has a significant air base in Latakia, called Hmeimim, which it has used as a launching pad for airstrikes across Syria since it intervened in the country’s bloody civil war in 2015.

“It may not be a matter of a complete evacuation of the bases at this time,” Mardasov said. “Instead, a new government, possibly appointed after March 2025, should issue a decree that denounces or legitimizes Damascus’s previous treaty with Moscow.”

An absolute minimum of forces in Syria would “deprive” Russia of its ability to counter NATO on its southern flank, Mardasov said.

Renewed access

Russia signed a renewable 49-year lease with the Assad regime for these bases in 2017, seemingly entrenching its forces in the Middle East for generations to come. The treaty even granted the Russian military legal immunity for its personnel in the country, meaning they would not be held responsible for killing Syrians.

“I can’t say whether the 2017 agreements are binding, but at this point only Russia can enforce them, and there are no signs they have the will or ability to do so,” Dubow said. “If Damascus orders Russia to leave, Moscow will have a hard time withstanding a siege.”

Russia’s best hope may be to try to expand its access until new deals can be struck with Syria’s new leaders. The offers will likely have to be very lucrative to win over the Syrian opposition, which is used to Russian airstrikes and ruthless mercenaries.

Russia would likely offer cash and other economic incentives, such as discounted refined fuel products, in exchange for Syria’s new rulers tolerating its military presence.

But these would likely be short-term arrangements.

“In the long term, it is unlikely that Russia will be able to continue using the facilities, given the significant antipathy towards Russia among the new Syrian authorities following Russia’s years of support for the Assad regime,” said Matthew Orr, a Eurasia analyst at the risk information company RANE. .

Syria’s interim authorities could even benefit from a continued Russian presence in the short term, he said. That could counterbalance the American presence on the other side of the country and serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations with other powers.

Complete withdrawal

Russia’s choices are grim if it fails to reach an agreement. It may seek to guard bases in an awkward confrontation with HTS-led forces, risking having its forces harmed or captured and subjected to trials that would humiliate Russia. Or it can airlift its forces and equipment out.

Orr, the RANE analyst, does not expect a hasty Russian withdrawal from Syria. Instead, Russia is likely preparing “for an orderly withdrawal from the facilities, likely after failed attempts to negotiate their retention in the coming months,” Orr told BI.

“Their loss would harm Russian power projection because they are critical logistics points for Russian military operations in Africa, the Middle East and Russia’s global naval operations, and Russia does not have immediately available alternatives to the facilities.”

Tartus remains from Moscow only naval facility in the Mediterraneanmaking it critical to any expanded deployment of the Russian Navy south of the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits. Together with Hmeimim, it serves as a hub for supporting Russian military and mercenary forces in Africa.

Moscow has had access to Tartus since the Soviet era in the 1970s. Moreover, Russia invested in its expansion in the 2010s, making the potential loss all the more painful.

An alternative Russian port outside Syria could be Tobruk in eastern Libya, which is controlled by Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. CEPA’s Dubow is skeptical that the Libyan port near Egypt could be an alternative.

“Tobruk wouldn’t come close to making up for Tartus and Latakia,” Dubow said. “It is both smaller and much further away from Russia. Even a significant reduction in Russia’s presence in Syria would greatly damage Russia’s power projection capacity.”

In this case, could Russia’s loss be Turkey’s gain? Turkey is close to the HTS-led coalition, but this country may also lack the cachet to acquire permanent bases.

“The Turkish Navy does not need the Tartus base, and the possibility will depend on the security conditions on the ground, which are still unclear for many months, so it does not seem likely in the short term,” RANE’s Orr said.

“But overall, the port of Tartus is something that if there is a unified government in Syria, they will certainly try to increase security and economic ties with a major power, or remove the base as part of the geopolitical balance between powers.”

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about developments in the Middle East, military affairs, politics and history. His articles have appeared in various publications focused on the region.

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