On the day of Ukraine’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Anton says the nuclear weapons base where he served was put on full alert.
“Before that we only had exercises. But on the day the war started, the weapons were fully in place,” says the former Russian nuclear force officer. “We were ready to launch forces into the sea and air and, in theory, launch a nuclear attack.”
I met Anton at a secret location outside Russia. For its own protection, the BBC does not want to reveal where. We also changed his name and don’t show his face.
Anton was an officer at a top-secret nuclear weapons facility in Russia.
He has shown us documents confirming his unit, rank and base.
The BBC is unable to independently verify all the events he described, although they were consistent with Russian statements at the time.
The former officer (L) spoke to the BBC at a secret location – his face has been blurred to conceal his identity [BBC]
Three days after troops flooded Ukraine’s borders, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia’s nuclear deterrent forces had been ordered into a “special combat service.”
Anton says a combat alert was in effect on the first day of the war and claims his unit was “locked inside the base.”
“All we had was Russian state television,” says the former officer. “I didn’t really know what it all meant. I automatically performed my tasks. We didn’t fight the war, we just guarded the nuclear weapons.”
The state of alarm was lifted after two to three weeks, he added.
Anton’s testimony provides insight into the top-secret inner workings of Russia’s nuclear forces. It is extremely rare for soldiers to talk to journalists.
“There is a very strict selection process there. Everyone is a professional soldier, no conscripts,” he explains.
“There are constant checks and lie detector tests for everyone. The pay is much higher and the troops are not sent to war. They are there to repel or carry out a nuclear attack.”
The former officer says life was tightly controlled.
“It was my responsibility to ensure that the soldiers under me did not take phones into the nuclear base,” he explains.
“It is a closed society, there are no strangers. If you want your parents to visit, you must submit a request to the FSB security service three months in advance.”
Anton was part of the base’s security unit, a rapid response force that guarded the nuclear weapons.
“We had training exercises all the time. Our response time was two minutes,” he says with a hint of pride.
Russia has about 4,380 operational nuclear warheads, according to the Federation of American Scientists, but only 1,700 are “deployed” or ready for use. All NATO member states together have a comparable number.
There are also concerns about whether Putin might choose to deploy ‘non-strategic’, often tactical, nuclear weapons. These are smaller rockets that generally do not cause widespread fallout.
Its use would nevertheless lead to a dangerous escalation of the war.
The Kremlin has done everything it can to test the nerves of the West.
Just last week, Putin endorsed changes to nuclear doctrine – the official rules that dictate how and when Russia can launch nuclear weapons.
The doctrine now says that Russia can launch if it faces a “massive attack” of conventional missiles by a non-nuclear state, but “with the participation or support of a nuclear state.”
Russian officials say the updated doctrine “effectively eliminates” the possibility of battlefield defeat.
But is Russia’s nuclear arsenal fully functional?
Some Western experts have suggested that the weapons are largely Soviet-era and may not even work.
The former nuclear forces officer dismissed that view as a “very simplified view of so-called experts.”
“There may be some outdated types of weapons in some areas, but the country has a huge nuclear arsenal, a huge number of nuclear warheads, including constant combat patrols on land, sea and in the air.”
Russia’s nuclear weapons were fully operational and ready for battle, he claimed. “The work to maintain nuclear weapons is ongoing, it never stops, not even for a minute.”
Shortly after the full-scale war began, Anton said he was given what he describes as a “criminal order”: to give lectures to his troops using very specific written directives.
“They said that Ukrainian citizens are fighters and must be destroyed!” he exclaims. “That is a red line for me: it is a war crime. I said I will not spread this propaganda.”
Senior officers reprimanded Anton by transferring him to a regular assault brigade in another part of the country. He was told he would be sent to war.
These units are often sent into battle as a “first wave” and a number of Russian deserters have told the BBC that “troublemakers” who object to the war have been used as “cannon fodder”.
The Russian embassy in London did not respond to a request for comment.
Before he could be sent to the front lines, Anton signed a statement refusing to participate in the war and a criminal case was opened against him. He showed us documents confirming his transfer to the assault brigade and details of the criminal case.
He then decided to flee the country with the help of a volunteer organization for deserters.
“If I had run away from the nuclear power base, the local FSB security service would have responded decisively and I probably would not have been able to leave the country,” he said.
But he believes the security clearance system at the highest level failed because he was transferred to a regular assault brigade.
Anton said he wanted to let the world know that many Russian soldiers were against the war.
The volunteer organization that helps deserters, “Idite Lesom” [‘Go by the Forest’, in English, or ‘Get Lost’] has told the BBC that the number of deserters seeking help has risen to 350 per month.
The risks for those fleeing are also increasing. At least one deserter has been killed after fleeing abroad, and there have been several cases of men being forcibly returned to Russia and tried.
Although Anton has left Russia, he says security services are still looking for him there: “I am taking precautions here, working off the books and not appearing in any official system.”
He says he no longer talks to his friends at the nuclear base because he could endanger them: “They have to take lie detector tests, and any contact with me could lead to a criminal case.”
But he has no illusions about the risk he himself runs by helping other soldiers flee.
“I understand that the more I do that, the more likely they are to try to kill me.”
