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Submarine cables between Finland-Germany and Lithuania-Sweden were cut and possibly sabotaged.
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The incident is one of a number of similar incidents in recent years, highlighting the vulnerability of these lines.
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NATO is improving surveillance and coordination to protect critical underwater infrastructure.
Last month it was discovered that an underwater data cable between Finland and Germany and another between Lithuania and Sweden had been severed within a day of each other. The damage to the cables, which European officials said appeared intentional, underlines the truth how vulnerable these crucial submarine lines are.
Yi Peng 3, a Chinese-flagged cargo ship which had departed from Russia’s Ust-Luga port in the Gulf of Finland three days earlier and was tracked while loitering near the two locations, is suspected in connection with the incident. It is said to have dragged an anchor more than 100 miles, damaging the cables.
“No one believes that these cables were cut accidentally,” German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said in November. “We have to assume it is sabotage,” he added.
In a joint statement with his Finnish counterpart, Pistorius said the damage comes at a time when “our European security is threatened not only by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, but also by hybrid warfare by malicious actors.”
As Russia came under increased scrutiny, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied Russian involvement in the incident, saying that “it is completely absurd to keep blaming Russia for everything for no reason.”
Critical but vulnerable
In recent years, a series of incidents involving damage to underwater infrastructure have occurred, many of them in the same region.
Last year, Newnew Polar Bear, another Chinese cargo ship, damaged a gas pipeline between Estonia and Finland. The Chinese investigation concluded that the damage was accidental; However, the investigation in Estonia and Finland is still ongoing.
In 2022, a Norwegian underwater data cable was damaged and there was evidence of human involvement in that incident. In 2021, a 4.1 kilometer long section of another data cable disappeared from waters north of Norway.
However, the incident that received the most attention was the incident sabotage of the Nord Steam gas pipelines between Russia and Germany in September 2022. There are indications of this Ukrainian elements could be behind the sabotage, but this has not been confirmed.
Underwater infrastructure is becoming increasingly important to modern life. The vast majority of internet traffic passes underwater fiber optic cablesand underwater energy pipelines are common in many regions. But protecting this infrastructure, which can extend for hundreds or thousands of kilometers, is difficult.
“There’s no way we can have all these thousands of miles of undersea, offshore infrastructure on our own. NATO presence may be impossible,” then-NATO leader Jens Stoltenberg said in 2023. Still, NATO can be better at collecting and sharing information and intelligence “and connecting the dots,” he added.
NATO and the European Union are indeed trying to do that.
In May this year, NATO held its first meeting of the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network lhas launched its Maritime Center for the Security of Critical Submarine Infrastructure to better coordinate the capabilities of its members and increase cooperation among them.
Furthermore, the EU is financing several initiatives to develop unmanned surface and underwater systems to monitor critical areas and detect threats early.
But there are also legal issues in protecting underwater infrastructure, as it typically crosses the territorial waters of several countries and can also pass through international waters.
The usual suspects
While it can often be difficult to pinpoint blame when such infrastructure is damaged, officials have pointed out that Russian activities near underwater cables have intensified.
In 2017, the US admiral in charge of NATO’s submarines said the alliance “saw Russian underwater activity near submarine cables that I don’t think we ever saw.”
The war in Ukraine has added a new dimension to this matter.
“There are growing concerns that Russia could target undersea cables and other critical infrastructure in an attempt to disrupt Western life to gain leverage against the countries that provide security to Ukraine,” said David Cattler, chief of NATO intelligence. , last year.
Russia has developed a number of underwater capabilities and has a specialized unit, the Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research, dedicated to this task.
GUGIas the operation is also known, is a Russian elite unit which uses specialized surface and underwater vessels capable of underwater sabotage and surveillance. Yantar, one of GUGI’s special purpose spy ships, which nominally functions as a research vessel, has often been spotted near underwater cables.
In addition, a joint investigation published in 2023 by the public broadcasters of Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland found that Russia had employed a fleet of 50 boats – masked as research or commercial vessels – to gather intelligence over the past decade. collect information about allied submarines. cables and wind farms in the Scandinavian region.
“Now if you look at the evidence of their activities, the places where they are conducting investigations, overlaid with this critical undersea infrastructure… you can see that they are at least indicating that they have the intention and ability to take action in this area if they choose,” Cattler said.
Read the original article on Business Insider