The war in Ukraine shows that NATO’s biggest problem is not its strategy, the think tank argues

• The war in Ukraine is a wake-up call for NATO to stockpile more ammunition.

• NATO states need more ammunition and defense production to cover the losses in a long war.

• Powers like Russia and China have invested in huge numbers of artillery.

The war in Ukraine shows that the theory behind NATO’s combat doctrine is sound. The problem is that Britain and many other NATO allies do not have the resources to implement it, a new report says.

There is no “convincing evidence to suggest that the war necessitates fundamental changes to key ideas and terms in joint UK or Allied operational-level doctrine, such as the maneuver approach, the comprehensive approach or mission command,” he said. the think tank RAND Europe. , which reviewed open source literature on the war in Ukraine on behalf of the British Ministry of Defense. The report refutes other experts who have argued that the West’s maneuvering strategy as ground combat faces increasing threats.

But to win a major conflict like Ukraine, NATO is lacking sufficient equipment and ammunition. The war in Ukraine was characterized by heavy losses of armored vehicles and artillery, as well as huge expenditures on ammunition, which put pressure on the economies of the warring parties. NATO stockpiles and defense production capacity had already declined after the end of the Cold War: providing Ukraine with a steady supply of weapons and replenishing their stockpiles has proven to be a huge challenge.

“The published literature on Ukraine suggests that the most pressing question is not whether NATO-Britain joint doctrine is appropriate, but rather whether sufficient resources are available to credibly implement these ideas and principles as envisioned, especially in the course of a long war. RAND warned.

Ukraine is a conflict of contradictions, where 21st century technologies such as drones coexist with artillery barrages and trench warfare directly from 1917. While militaries want to learn lessons for future wars, it is not easy to distinguish between what is old and what is new – and what the specifics of the war in Ukraine are versus permanent trends.

For example, what is the future of air power? Manned aircraft have had a surprisingly limited impact on the war in Ukraine, as have helicopters. “The commitment of [ground-based air defenses] has highlighted the poor survivability of rotary-wing assets on both sides, with reduced use of platforms, including helicopters, for tactical air mobility maneuvers and [casualty evacuation]”compared to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,” RAND said. The sheer numbers and accuracy of air defense systems such as the Patriot (Ukraine) or S-300 and S-400s (Russia) force jets to fly at a distance from the battlefield, one of the reasons why battlefield lines are largely static.

These issues are hardly academic for NATO militaries. They operate the most numerous and advanced air forces in the world, stemming from the Cold War strategy of using tactical air power to halt and break the Soviet Union’s numerically superior ground forces. If its use is now much more limited, it indicates that NATO armies will face a much more difficult ground fight.

Drones have largely replaced manned aircraft for reconnaissance and attack missions. And small, expendable drones have replaced larger UAVs, such as Turkish-made ones Bayraktar 2 attack drone which Ukraine used to devastating effect in the early days of the war. Yet the massive use of drones has not brought victory to either side.

Ukraine has tried to shed Soviet-era doctrine in favor of a Western war of maneuver, with limited but inconclusive success. Russia has used massive artillery barrages and human wave attacks – the same tactics the Red Army used against the Germans in World War II – to make steady but increasing gains at ferocious costs; by one estimationNovember was the highest month for Russian soldiers killed and injured throughout the war.

“Without air power, neither maneuver nor positional warfare has led to a decisive strategic outcome, but claims in the literature about the demise of such approaches are premature,” RAND said.

The apparent neutralization of the air force is bad news for NATO. Western countries have tended to invest in aircraft rather than building huge numbers of artillery pieces, as Russia and China have done.

RAND does see a number of lasting lessons from the war in Ukraine for NATO. Sufficient quantities of personnel and material are available to absorb and replenish the constant drain of combat losses in a long war. “While the efficiencies offered by new technology can offset the need for mass in certain situations, it cannot replace the overall need for mass. We have not yet seen a breakthrough technology or tactic that negates the need for critical mass in terms of personnel, infrastructure and personnel. , equipment and supplies.”

These problems are particularly acute for Britain. The British army does shrink to 72,000 soldiers – the lowest level since the Napoleonic Wars – while the Royal Navy and Air Force are also a fraction of their Cold War strength. In the event of a war with Russia, such as an invasion of Poland or Eastern Europe, Britain might hardly be able to scrape together a full-strength mechanized division.

The RAND study also examines how military power comes from more than just weapons and strategy. For example, the Kremlin’s worst mistake was: underestimates the determination of the Ukrainian people and the government to maintain their independence as a nation. “The war has once again emphasized the importance of a narrative and audience-oriented approach. This includes the crucial but often overlooked role of a national will to fight – a topic extensively analyzed at RAND, but often overlooked, especially in Western defense establishments.^“

Perhaps the greatest lesson of the war in Ukraine is the importance of adaptability. Ukraine and Russia have proven to be rigid in some respects but very flexible in others, such as controlling the use of drones. “For example, beyond technology trends toward automation, process optimization, and a more transparent, networked, and data-rich battlespace, the war has reiterated the lasting impact of uncertainty and friction on complicating operations,” RAND said.

This means that NATO must continually reconsider its doctrine. The war in Ukraine “highlights the crucial distinction between innovation (combining old with new) versus adaptation (to counter the enemy’s new tactics) and the need to promote both (not necessarily prioritizing the new)” , RAND concluded.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine and other publications. He has an MA in Political Science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him further Tweet And LinkedIn.

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