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Some observers have argued that surprise attacks are virtually impossible because of widespread surveillance.
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The Ukrainian Kursk invasion took Russia by surprise and followed a time-honored tactic.
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The question for Ukraine is whether Kursk will do better than the German Ardennes offensive.
When Ukraine unleashed its Kursk offensive in August, it was not just the Russians who were surprised.
Some experts had argued that large-scale attacks were no longer possible in modern warfare. Any attempt to join forces for a penetration would be quickly spotted dronesspy planes or satellites, the thinking went, which would allow the defender to strengthen his defenses.
“The proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the war between Ukraine and Russia has created a transparent battlefield characterized by near-persistent surveillance, making operational surprise difficult to achieve,” said one blogging by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
But despite hordes of Russian drones keeping a close eye on Ukrainian movements, Ukraine succeeded concentrate his best brigades for an attack that stunned the Kremlin and seized 500 square miles at the height of the offensive.
How did Ukraine do it? By using the same time-honored techniques that Germany used in its surprise attack on the Battle of the Ardennes December 1944.
First came careful preparation by identifying weak spots in the Russian defenses. Amassing troops for offensives in eastern Ukraine thinned out the rest of the 900-kilometer front line, including the Kursk region. Open-source intelligence “indicates that up to 75 percent of Russia’s ground troops, airborne units and naval infantry are deployed in or near eastern Ukraine,” TRADOC said. And because Russian drones and other ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems were concentrated in areas where Russia was attacking, this meant lighter coverage of Kursk.
Similarly, in late 1944 – even as Germany was reeling from massive defeats in Normandy and an advancing Russia on the Eastern Front – Hitler and his top advisers identified the Ardennes in Belgium as a weak spot in the center of the Allied lines. As American and British forces concentrated in the north and south for a final offensive against Germany, the Allies viewed the hilly, forested terrain of the Ardennes as a quiet sector that could be safely defended with a few exhausted or inexperienced divisions. The heavy woods could serve as cover for the German infantry and armored units as they advanced.
Before the attack in August, the Ukrainian High Command also ensured that word of the operation was communicated to as few people as possible. “Once the intelligence was collected and analyzed, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, led the planning with only a few senior officers,” TRADOC said. “The planning sessions likely took place face-to-face to prevent Russian cyber actors or signals intelligence from discovering the plan. Press interviews with Ukrainian soldiers show that the invading troops were only informed hours before the operation.”
To conceal its preparations, Ukraine also resorted to disinformation, such as spreading reports about the Ukrainian military wouldn’t be able to of launching an offensive before spring 2025. Ukrainian forces were unaware of some of the deception. “For example, the Ukrainian army announced that the 61st Mechanized Brigade would move to Vovchansk, a city in the northern sector of the fighting in eastern Ukraine,” TRADOC said. “Even after the 61st was told they were going to invade Russia, senior officers in the unit thought it was a bluff.”
Likewise, knowledge of the Ardennes offensive – codenamed Operation Wacht am Rhein – was limited to a small circle of officers who were sworn to secrecy on pain of death. Allied cryptographers had broken high-level German radio codes (the “Ultra” program), but German forces used radio silence and orders were relayed by courier and telephone. Even the name Wacht am Rhein (“Watch on the Rhine”) was intended to convince Allied intelligence services that it was a defensive plan to stop the Allied crossing of the Rhine into Germany.
Ukraine prepared its offensive by blinding the Russian ISR with attacks on Russian airfields, and using Ukrainian drones to destroy Russian UAVs. To delay a Russian response, Ukraine used missiles, drones and artillery-delivered mines against air bases and command and control centers, and banned Russian reinforcements.
This was also a reflection of Nazi Germany’s final offensive. The operation in the Ardennes was planned to coincide with a long period of bad weather, which grounded the Allied reconnaissance aircraft. On the misty dawn of December 16, 1944, heavy German artillery fire disrupted American communications, while German commandos – dressed in American uniforms – infiltrated American lines to sow confusion and panic.
The question for Ukraine is whether that is the case Operation Kursk will do better than the Ardennes. Instead of a breakthrough that changed the tide of World War II, the German offensive ultimately stalled due to poor terrain, lack of fuel, and stiff American resistance.
Although the Ukrainian offensive has seized some Russian territory and caused consternation in Moscow, it has failed to divert Russian forces from eastern Ukraine, and Russian counterattacks are reducing the Ukrainian salient.
Nevertheless, Ukraine has shown that surprise attacks are possible even in the United States Drone era. “The Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region has shown that operational surprise is still possible in the Ukrainian conflict by avoiding and lowering ISR – a lesson that could broadly also be applied to future large-scale combat operations in other theaters,” concluded TRADOC.
Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine and other publications. He has an MA in Political Science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him further Tweet And LinkedIn.
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