As Ukraine’s foreign minister wraps up his latest tour of Africa, his country risks paying a heavy diplomatic price for its aid to separatist rebels in northern Mali, who inflicted a crushing defeat on Russian military operator Wagner late last month.
The ambush at Tinzaouten on July 27 reportedly left 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian soldiers dead.
It was a painful military blow for the mercenary organization once led by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin but now under the control of Russia’s official defense command.
Just two days later, Andriy Yusov, spokesman for Kiev’s military intelligence service (GUR), said that ethnic Tuareg rebels in Mali had “received the necessary information, and not just any information, that enabled a successful military operation against Russian war criminals.”
Later reports suggested that Ukrainian special forces had trained the separatists in the use of attack drones.
For many Africans, however, this was yet another example of foreign powers abusing the continent as a bloody playing field for their own rivalries.
As expected, the military junta in Mali and the allied regime in neighboring Niger protested by breaking diplomatic ties with Kiev.
But far more important was a statement from the regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Despite its own diplomatic problems with the military regimes in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, it was clear in its disapproval.
It expressed its “strong disapproval and condemnation of any foreign intervention in the region that could pose a threat to peace and security in West Africa and any attempt to draw the region into the current geopolitical confrontations”.
Anger will have been fuelled by suggestions that some jihadist militants had joined Tuareg separatists in the attack on Tinzaouaten.
Senegal’s foreign ministry summoned Ukraine’s ambassador to Dakar to protest after he posted a Facebook video of Mr Yusov’s cheering remarks.
Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba toured Malawi, Zambia and Mauritius last week. But after the harsh words from Ecowas and Senegal, he may now have to deal with serious fence-mending in West Africa.
What many governments in sub-Saharan Africa — even those that secretly distrust Moscow — are likely to see as Kiev’s unhelpful military adventure from the outside could undo the goodwill so carefully built over the past two years through peaceful Ukrainian diplomacy.
From a military point of view, it was a success for the Ukrainians that they inflicted on Wagner the heaviest African defeat ever.
The mercenary contractor, now officially called Corps Africa after coming under Russian control, had doubled its manpower in Mali in the past two years to an estimated 2,000.
News of the heavy losses in Tinzaouaten came as a shock, especially since the Malian army and Wagner’s troops had captured Kidal, the ‘capital’ of the Tuareg rebels, in November last year.
The Tinzaouaten incident heralded the resumption of separatist offensive actions, with, as soon became clear, the support of a new partner.
Kiev’s hints at direct involvement confirm how far it is prepared to go in its fight against Russia President Vladimir Putin far beyond one’s own battlefield.
This is not the first time that Wagner has directly intervened in military operations in Africa.
There were strong indications that Ukrainian special forces carried out drone strikes in Sudan last August and September in support of the military regime led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.
For more than a year, the party has been locked in a brutal power struggle with its former allies, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as “Hemedti”, who is assisted by Wagner.
Some Ukrainian military commentators, such as Evgeniy Dikiy, a former commander of Ukraine’s Aidar Battalion, describe their country’s reported military interventions in Africa primarily as a struggle for survival after Russian forces invaded the country in February 2022.
Mr Dikiy has argued that Kiev has no Africa policy, but has scores to settle with Russia, and in particular with Wagner.
But the administration of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may not see things so simplistically.
Because it knows that the fight against Moscow is not only on the battlefield. Diplomacy and trade are also important.
And immediately after the 2022 invasion, Kiev was painfully reminded of this truth, especially with regard to Africa.
On March 2 of that year, at the UN General Assembly, only 28 of the 54 African member states voted to condemn the invasion.
While only a few of Moscow’s close allies actually voted in favor of the Russian action, many other African governments actively abstained or stayed out of the vote, including governments generally considered to be strongly pro-Western.
And later, when President Putin withdrew from the deal that had allowed both Ukraine and Russia to export grain – much of it destined for Africa – and have it transported safely through the Black Sea, many governments in the sub-Saharan region chose to view the setback neutrally rather than blame Moscow.
While this particular issue has become less important now that Ukraine has largely been allowed to ship grain again following the attack on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Foreign Ministry team in Kiev is still convinced that it needs to rebuild its political and economic networks in Africa.
Mr Kuleba has now made four African trips. And while his campaign to build goodwill and partnerships in sub-Saharan Africa has not always been without its problems – hopes of being received by President Cyril Ramaphosa during a visit to South Africa late last year were dashed – there have been some significant successes.
For example, Zambia attended the Ukrainian peace summit in Switzerland in June and, unlike some other participants, signed the final communiqué (the terms of which were satisfactory to Kiev).
And last week, Mr Kuleba visited Zambia’s capital, Lusaka, where he was received by President Hakainde Hichilema.
By now seeking rapprochement with African countries, Ukraine is trying to make up for the diplomatic deficit it suffered in the first three decades after its independence, when it was mainly concerned with domestic affairs.
While Russia took over the global diplomatic presence of the former Soviet Union, newly independent countries like Ukraine had to build their networks from scratch.
With limited resources, Kiev managed to open only eight embassies on the entire African continent over the course of 30 years: in Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa.
But after being uncomfortably reminded of the need to win friends and influence people in 2022, Kiev is now trying to rapidly expand its messaging. The goal is to set up a network of 20 African embassies. The first 10 additional missions have already been announced.
In April, Kiev’s special envoy for the Middle East and Africa, Maksym Soubkh, was in Abidjan to open the embassy in Ivory Coast.
And Kiev represents more than just diplomatic cooperation.
Eight sub-Saharan countries have already benefited from the ‘Grain from Ukraine’ food aid initiative.
The country also wants to expand its development aid, strengthen trade and create more university places for African students.
Controversial military adventures targeting Russian mercenaries seem an unwise risk that could jeopardize all the diplomatic goodwill and economic returns Ukraine hopes to gain from its broad, positive strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa.
Paul Melly is a consultant with the Africa Programme at Chatham House in London.
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