How a uranium mine became a pawn in the feud between Niger and France

In the latest sign of a dramatic deterioration in relations, Niger’s military rulers appear increasingly determined to drive France out of every key sector of their economy – and especially out of uranium mining.

This week, France’s state-owned nuclear company Orano announced that the junta – which ousted French ally President Mohamed Bazoum in a coup in July 2023 – had taken operational control of its local mining company Somaïr.

The company’s attempts to resume exports have been blocked by the regime for months and the company is in financial crisis.

And the impact could be felt more widely: Although Niger accounts for less than 5% of global uranium output, it accounted for a quarter of the supply to nuclear power plants across Europe in 2022.

So the timing could hardly be more inconvenient as Western countries struggle to meet the challenge of climate change and reduce their CO2 emissions from electricity generation.

For French President Emmanuel Macron, who is already struggling with a political crisis at home, Orano’s potential departure from Niger is certainly uncomfortable in terms of image.

Because it coincides with shocking news from other long-standing African partners: Chad has suddenly announced the end of a defense deal with Paris, while Senegal has reaffirmed its insistence on the eventual closure of the French military base in Dakar.

But in any case, the crisis facing Orano in Niger poses a significant practical challenge for France’s energy supply.

With 18 nuclear power plants, a total of 56 reactors, generating almost 65% of electricity, France is leading the way in limiting CO2 emissions from the energy sector.

But the country’s limited production of uranium ended more than two decades ago.

Over the past ten years, the country has imported almost 90,000 tons, a fifth of which came from Niger. Only Kazakhstan – which accounts for 45% of global production – was a more important source of supply.

The continued paralysis, or permanent cessation, of Orano’s activities in Niger would certainly force France to look elsewhere.

This should be feasible as alternative supplies can be obtained from countries such as Uzbekistan, Australia and Namibia.

When West African neighbors responded to the coup in Niger last year by imposing a trade blockade that crippled uranium exports, other suppliers immediately stepped into the breach.

The European Union’s imports of the mineral from the country fell by a third, but this was largely replaced by Canada.

But there was also a politically difficult price to pay. EU imports of uranium from Russia increased by more than 70%, despite the heavy sanctions imposed on Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine.

And of course, it is Russia that has become the new best friend of the military leaders who have seized power in Niger and its allied neighbors, Burkina Faso and Mali, since 2020.

Russian military contractors are fighting alongside the Malian army in its campaign against jihadists and ethnic Tuareg separatists, while also helping protect the senior leadership of the juntas in Niger and Burkina Faso.

So while France, and Europe in general, could find ways to cope with a permanent loss of Niger’s uranium supply, the shift would not be entirely comfortable.

At least in the short term, EU countries would likely become more dependent on Russia and its Central Asian neighbors, hampering their own efforts to maintain economic pressure on President Vladimir Putin during a potentially crucial period in the Ukraine crisis , would be undermined.

Moreover, the Niger regime, whose attitude toward the EU as a whole has become almost as wary as its fractured relationship with France, continues to look for alternatives to its old Western partnerships.

And Iran – obviously a potential customer for uranium – has emerged as an option.

Contacts between the two governments deepened when Nigerien Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine visited Tehran in January. A few months ago, rumors started circulating about a possible deal for the supply of uranium “Yellowcake” (concentrate).

Meanwhile, the prospects for Orano’s hopes of restoring normal uranium operations and exports from Niger appear bleak, given the hostile attitude of the military regime in Niamey.

That antipathy is partly explained by Macron’s outspoken condemnation of the July 2023 overthrow of Bazoum, who had been one of his closest African political and security partners.

Paris firmly backed the hardline stance of the West African regional group ECOWAS, and was even rumored to have been willing to provide tacit support if the bloc had ever followed through on its short-lived threat to intervene militarily in Niger to restore Bazoum .

In this toxic atmosphere of hostility and mistrust, Orano was an obvious and convenient target for junta retaliation.

The French company’s dominant role in the uranium sector had fueled resentment among many Nigerians for years, amid claims that the French company bought their uranium cheaply despite periodic renegotiations of the export deal. Although mining activities did not begin until years after independence, they were seen as emblematic of France’s continued postcolonial influence.

After last year’s coup, Orano itself tried to stay out of the diplomatic row, keep a low profile and continue to function normally.

But ECOWAS’ trade blockade prevented it from exporting production from the Somaïr mine, near Arlit, in the Sahara Desert.

And even after sanctions were lifted in late February, the usual uranium export route, via Benin’s port of Cotonou, remained blocked as the junta kept the border closed in an ongoing political row with Benin.

Orano offered to fly out the uranium, but the regime shunned this proposal.

In June, the junta canceled the French company’s rights to develop a new mine at the large Imouraren deposit, which was seen as the uranium sector’s main new hope for future growth.

Meanwhile, the export blockage pushed Somaïr, which was sitting on 1,150 tonnes of blocked stockpiles of uranium concentrate worth $210m (£165m) in November, into a financial crisis.

And when Orano decided to halt further production and prioritize the payment of staff salaries, relations with the government deteriorated even further, leading to a near-total collapse of production this week.

Of course, it is not only the company, but also Niger’s economy that is paying the price for this situation, in the form of lost export revenues and the risk of hundreds of jobs.

For Arlit and other communities in the desert north, this would be a devastating blow, despite rumors of renewed activity at a Chinese mining project in the region and some interest in the sector among other potential partners.

But Niger’s junta sees no need to make concessions to Orano because it is now buoyed by a sharp increase in oil exports, thanks to a new pipeline built by China.

With that financial cushion, the regime appears prepared to bear the costs of crippling and likely dismantling the traditional uranium partnership with France – now its main international adversary.

Paul Melly is a consulting fellow at the Africa Program at Chatham House in London.

You may also be interested in:

Go to BBCAfrica.com for more news from the African continent.

Follow us on Twitter @BBCAfricaon Facebook at BBC Africa or on Instagram at BBCAfrica

BBC Africa Podcasts